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Obama’s Middle East Policy:  
Time to Decide
Gregorio Bettiza is a PhD candidate in International Relations and IDEAS Centre Stonex Scholar at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science.  
Christopher Phillips is a PhD student in International Relations at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science and Programme Assistant on the IDEAS Middle East International 
Affairs Programme.
President Obama came into office with a clear international priority: fixing America’s faltering Middle East foreign policy. With two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a disaffected Middle East, 
the continuous simmering terrorist threat, disenfranchised allies, emboldened regional rivals and the 
perpetually floundering Israeli-Palestinian peace process, this was a mammoth task. Alongside the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the incoming president’s Middle East goals focused on: rebuilding 
America’s soft power and standing in the region; engaging immediately in a more even handed way 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and lastly, devising a more pragmatic and realist strategy to curtail 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
After a year in office no major breakthrough has occurred. Iran is still pursuing nuclear technology, 
prospects for an Israeli-Arab peace are unrealised and, while anti-Americanism in the region seems 
less pronounced than under Bush, the threat of terrorism is still alive and well. Perhaps it would be 
Pollyannish to hope for progress after only 12 months and this article will not seek to sensationally or 
prematurely grade Obama’s achievements. Instead it seeks to provide an assessment of whether during 
his first year of presidency, Obama has effectively laid the groundwork for future policy successes, simply 
prevented an explosive situation from getting worse or actually overseen a regression in the region. 
IT’S SOFT POWER, STUPID
Seven years of Bush’s ‘War on Terror’, with its divisive rhetoric, misguided war in Iraq and unlawful 
treatment of prisoners left America’s reputation in the Middle East in tatters. Recognizing that the US 
had exhausted its reserves of soft power, a key Obama priority once in office was to replenish them. 
The language of the new administration sought to show Middle Eastern leaders and the Arab street 
alike that Washington was now keener to listen than to lecture. 
The first visible shift of the Obama presidency was in its rhetoric. Determined to reach out and re-
engage with the Arab and Muslim world, Obama gave his first interview as president to Al-Arabiyya, 
an Arab satellite station. In a revealing passage, he pointed out that part of his new job was to 
“communicate the fact that the United States has a stake in the well-being of the Muslim world, 
that the language we use has to be a language of respect”. The President reiterated this message 
with even greater effect during his Cairo speech a few months later where he repeatedly quoted the 
Koran and called for a “new beginning between the United States and Muslims”. 
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Alongside this change in rhetoric, Obama sought to redefine the parameters 
of the ‘War on Terror’ and how this should be fought. Rather than fighting a 
nebulous war against worldwide Islamofascism, America would now be engaged 
in a clearly defined war against a “far-reaching network of violence and hatred”, 
as Obama labelled Al-Qaeda in his inaugural speech. The focus has shifted to 
a counter insurgency/counter terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, rather than 
pursuing an open ended war against terrorism which was sending ripples across 
the Middle East. 
Furthermore, forceful strategies of democracy promotion abroad were shelved 
whilst respecting human rights at home was emphasised. During his first 
weeks Obama symbolically issued executive orders requiring the closure of 
the Guantanamo detention camp along with banning torture and enhanced 
interrogation techniques. These moves were intimately tied with his desire to 
re-establish America’s international legitimacy and restore its capacity to lead by 
example. Rather than bullying Middle Eastern countries into democratic reform as 
was Bush’s want, Obama adopted a more hands off approach. 2009 saw silence 
from the White House during Iran’s post-election protests, limited intervention in 
Lebanon’s parliamentary polls and the adoption of narrower military objectives in 
Afghanistan rather than ambitious democratization goals. 
Yet a shift in rhetoric can only go so far in rebuilding US credibility in the region. 
The Muslim world continues to scrutinize the President’s actions as much as his 
speeches. 24-hour news channels broadcasting images of US troops still fighting 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza, 
serve to undermine any message of reconciliation. Obama’s quiet abandonment 
of democracy advocacy, highlighted by recent congressional cuts in democracy 
and governance aid for Middle Eastern states, similarly risks increasing cynicism 
towards the administration’s new approach. Whilst Bush’s democracy promotion 
at gunpoint was detested, the Obama administration’s continued support for 
unpopular dictators such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, its propping up of Mahmoud 
Abbas’ legally-questionable presidential mandate extension, and the near-farcical 
acceptance of Hamid Karzai’s fraudulent re-election in Afghanistan have dampened 
any Muslim optimism Obama may have earned in Cairo. 
Moreover, recent events have shown the fragility of the new administration’s 
rhetorical shift. Under pressure from Republican critics after the attempted Christmas 
Day Detroit flight bombing, Obama vowed to, “…use every element of our 
national power to disrupt, to dismantle and to defeat the violent extremists who 
threaten us, whether they are from Afghanistan or Pakistan, Yemen or Somalia; 
or anywhere...” He might be able to persuade liberal supporters back home that 
this is not a return to Bush’s neo-conservatism, but such language will not endear 
him to a Muslim world increasingly doubting the authenticity of his rhetoric.
Obama is burdened by the weight of expectation of a Muslim world who hoped 
he would not only reverse the hostility of the Bush years but somehow surpass 
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previous US leaders in the Middle East. The reality 
they face, that Obama has simply returned to the 
realism of previous administrations, is a bitter pill to 
swallow. Whilst a foreign policy success in the Muslim 
world could still consolidate the raised expectations 
of his Cairo speech, the longer they must wait, the 
more Obama is in danger of squandering this newly 
earned soft power.
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: 
TREADING WATER 
It was widely hoped that one such success could be 
in Israel-Palestine. Seen as a keystone to defusing 
tension in the Middle East and improving America’s 
regional standing, Obama has wasted no time in 
tackling the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Indeed, while the Clinton and W. Bush presidencies 
waited several years before confronting the problem, 
Obama engaged from day one. His first international 
phone call as President was to Palestinian leader 
Mahmoud Abbas, immediately followed by calls to 
then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, President 
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah II of 
Jordan. On his second day in office he named George 
Mitchell, famed for his successful role in the Northern 
Ireland peace process, as Middle East special envoy. 
Obama has struck a more realist tone than previous 
administrations in his dealings with Tel Aviv, seemingly 
recognising that unconditional support for Israel, and 
its continued occupation and settlement expansion 
of the West Bank, is not in the US’s national interest. 
Seeking to pursue a more even handed approach to 
the peace process, Obama has pressured and cajoled 
the Netanyahu government to abandon its continued 
construction of illegal settlements. Such constant 
US pressure mounted on the reluctant Israeli prime 
minister has seen relations between the two heads 
of state sink to a surprising low over the past year.
Yet despite this astute recognition of the importance 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Obama’s interest has 
not produced results. Israel’s intransigence, assisted 
by its sympathetic US lobby, has forced the White 
House to a stalemate on settlement freezes. At the 
same time, the embattled Palestinian Authority (PA) 
has weakened further. Abbas, already discredited by 
his embarrassing reversal on the Goldstone report 
investigating the Gaza War, followed Obama’s line 
on settlements as a condition to resuming peace 
talks. Having taken a stand, the Palestinian leader is 
now unable to climb down on the issue, yet Israel 
will not resume negotiations until he does, effectively 
freezing the peace process. 
Meanwhile Obama has proved unwilling to address 
the estrangement of Hamas from the PA, leaving all 
attempts to reconcile the two Palestinian factions 
to regional proxies like Egypt. Despite the poverty 
in Gaza brought on by the damage of the 2008/9 
conflict and continued blockade, Hamas remains 
firmly in power and looks soon to enhance its appeal 
should the proposed prisoner exchange for Gilad 
Shalit go ahead. Though Obama may have committed 
renewed energy into resolving the conflict, he has 
proved unwilling to sacrifice long-standing sacred 
cows such as engaging with Hamas or exercising 
real, financial, pressure on Israel.
Whilst some might accuse Obama of naivety in 
his assessment of these long-standing problems 
he has also been unlucky. The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is arguably at the most fractured it has ever 
been. The Palestinians are no longer represented 
by a single viable body, but by two bitterly divided 
factions, one of which the US considers illegitimate. 
In Benyamin Netanyahu and his Foreign Minister 
Avigdor Lieberman the White House faces one of 
the most intransigent governments Israel has ever 
had. Some could argue that the relatively minor 
concessions already won, the partial settlement freeze 
and hypothetical acceptance of a future Palestinian 
state is achievement enough for Obama’s first year 
given the hand dealt to him.
If 2009 has seen Obama frustratingly tread water, in 
2010 the President will need to decide if he wants 
to do more than simply appear to be engaging with 
the peace process. Whilst renewed shuttle diplomacy 
and confidence-building measures between Abbas 
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and Netanyahu could yield minor developments, Obama will need to enforce major sacrifices on each 
side to make real progress. George Mitchell has recently mooted the withholding of loan guarantees 
from Israel to pressure Tel Aviv into action, a technique used successfully by George H W Bush in 
1991 to push Yitzak Shamir to the Madrid Peace Conference. Yet beyond this, it is unlikely that the 
more controversial options, such as engaging with Hamas, will be considered. Alternatively Obama 
might choose to sideline the Palestinian track and sponsor an Israeli-Syrian peace, as has been quietly 
considered following a comparative softening of Washington’s attitude to Damascus in the last year. 
Having been fought to a stalemate, Obama must assess whether he wants to prepare for a second 
round or leave things in stasis whilst focusing his energies elsewhere. As analyst David Aaron Miller 
cynically states, “He doesn’t need Arab-Israeli peace to be considered a consequential president.”
TESTING A NEW WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN 
An even bigger shift has taken place in US foreign policy towards Iran. Obama abandoned Bush’s one-
dimensional confrontational stance, which had achieved little or nothing, preferring a multidimensional 
strategy of ‘diplomacy, punishment and containment’. Numerous and unprecedented overtures have 
been made to Teheran, such as the inaugural speech’s famous “extended hand”, in order to find a 
diplomatic solution to the nuclear impasse. While finally engaging with Iran, the new US administration 
also sought to revive international momentum against nuclear proliferation and multilateral support 
against Iran’ nuclear ambitions in forums such as the UN.
Yet the new President has not been naïve. With time running out, Obama recently argued in his 
Nobel Peace Prize speech that the international community should increase its pressure and enforce 
sanctions that can “exact a real price” and are “tough enough to actually change behaviour”. Parallel 
to threatening sanctions, his administration has devised a clearer containment strategy. First, deciding 
to shift the deployment of the European missile shield in favour of strengthening a Middle Eastern 
missile defence system designed to better intercept Iran’s capabilities. Second, by admitting publicly 
the possibility of extending a ‘defence (i.e. nuclear) umbrella’ over the Persian Gulf in the event of 
Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.
Complicating this strategy have been the internal struggles within Iran emerging from the disputed 
summer Presidential elections. Obama’s quiet immediately after the Iranian election suggested he 
hoped protests would subside allowing him to continue his diplomatic engagement with Tehran. As 
opposition continues, Obama has felt compelled to break his silence, most recently, “condemning 
the violent and unjust suppression of innocent Iranian citizens,” during the Christmas period. On 
the one hand, Obama knows that any overt public support for the opposition could taint their cause 
allowing Tehran to portray them as foreign puppets and initiate an even harsher crack down. On 
the other hand with President Ahmedinejad’s government being increasingly stubborn on nuclear 
negotiations, possibly as a consequence of these internal struggles, US policy makers are aware that 
an opposition victory might produce a government more willing to negotiate, though perhaps not 
the pro-Western fantasy that some of its foreign supporters envisage. 
Yet waiting and hoping that the opposition triumph and are then willing to negotiate more favourably 
on the nuclear issue is unpalatable and risks Israel acting alone, possibly with Saudi Arabia’s tacit 
support, to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities. Obama has already threatened “consequences” should 
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Ahmedinejad reject the latest deal, and, with Tehran ominously silent as the New Year 
deadline passed, the White House will be under pressure to initiate a new round of 
sanctions. There remains uncertainty, however, as to what impact sanctions could have. 
Will they entrench the regime as in Saddam’s Iraq? Could they embolden the opposition 
further or simply provide greater justification for Tehran’s crushing of them? Would they 
actually succeed in halting or delaying Iran’s nuclear program or destroy any hopes for 
cooperation, whilst Tehran becomes even more determined to defy the West and develop 
the bomb?
Of all the challenges Obama faces in his second year, Iran is expected to be the most 
pressing. Despite exploring a host of options, including international cooperation, diplomatic 
engagement and even talking the language of world-wide nuclear disarmament, Obama 
seems no closer to reaching a settlement with Tehran. He has been unfortunate once 
more in trying to apply a pragmatic engagement to an Iranian regime even more defiant 
and confrontational, as a result of internal struggles, than that faced by Bush. The White 
House is aware of the imprecise science of sanctions, but may find its hand forced into 
action as the lesser of two evils when compared to an Israeli military strike that could 
ignite a regional war. Whilst all options remain on the table, the pressure on Obama to 
produce results will only increase throughout the year.
TIME TO DECIDE
When it comes to foreign policy Obama has proven not a bleeding-heart idealist but a 
shrewd pragmatic realist with Nixonian echoes. Nowhere has this been more evident 
than in his Middle Eastern policy: abandoning the democratising rhetoric of Bush, scaling 
down Iraq, providing limited military objectives for Afghanistan and against Al-Qaeda, 
opening up to rivals and pressuring allies when this was considered in the national interest. 
This pragmatism drove Obama’s initial efforts at rebuilding America’s soft power in the 
Muslim World, for which he should be lauded, though any increased legitimacy earned has 
not been capitalised on. Now is the time for some tough decisions if Obama is to deliver 
results and avoid becoming a false prophet. To push forward Israeli-Palestinian peace 
sacred cows may need to be sacrificed such as talking to Hamas, financially pressuring 
Israel and restarting negotiations with Syria. To progress with Iran decisive action is needed, 
whether it be renewed diplomatic deals or international pressure and sanctions, that both 
maximises pressure on Tehran whilst minimising the damage felt by internal protestors.
After years of failures it may take just one major success for Obama to provide a snowball 
effect in the region upon which the White House can build. Yet the inability to deliver can 
only serve to increase the diminishing of newly acquired reserves of regional goodwill. 
Whilst a year of Obama has quelled the fires left by Bush’s incendiary foreign policy, and 
have certainly not made things worse, the 44th President’s second year needs tougher 
decisions if it is to reap the success he seeks. 
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